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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

WILLIAM REMINE,
Case No. 940127-CA

Petitioner and Appellant,
V•

Priority Mo. 15

UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS,
Respondent and Appellee.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OP PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the district court's denial of a
petition for extraordinary writ brought under Rule 65B, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. Remine's petition challenges a decision of the
Utah Board of Pardons and Parole.

This Court has jurisdiction

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(h) (Supp. 1993) because Remine
was convicted of a second degree felony.
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the Board of Pardons and Parole comply with procedural due
process

when

it

terminated

Remine's

parole

based

on

his

modification of the parole agreement and subsequent refusal to sign
an unadulterated agreement?
STANDARD OP APPELLATE REVIEW
This appeal arises from the trial court's granting of the
Board's motion to dismiss.

Thus, the facts as alleged in the

complaint are assumed to be true.
1

Therefore, because this issue

raises only questions of law, this Court should give the trial
court's ruling no deference and review it under a correctness
standard.

Citv of Logan v. Utah Power & Light Co,. 796 P.2d 697

(Utah 1990).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AMD RULES
All relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules
are attached to this brief as Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This

is an

appeal

from

the

denial

extraordinary relief pursuant to Rule 65B.

of

a petition

for

(R. at 125-26). Remine

filed this petition on November 18, 1993, challenging the Board's
termination of his parole on August 25, 1993.

The trial court

granted the Board's motion to dismiss, finding that the petition
failed to state a claim for relief.

(R. at 117; Addendum B) .

Remine filed this appeal on February 25, 1994. (R. at 119).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Remine was committed to the Utah State Prison on June 7, 1990
after being convicted of burglary, a third degree felony.

(R. at

74) . His sentence expires on July 12, 1995- (R. at 14) . The Board
initially paroled Remine on April 23, 1991, but due to a parole
violation, that parole was revoked and Remine was returned to the

2

prison in 1993 .l

On May 13, 1993, the Board decided to grant

Remine a new parole release date of June 8, 1993,

(R. at 13).

On May 28, 1993, in accordance with state statute and prison
policy, an employee of the Department of Corrections presented the
parole agreement to Remine for his signature.

Remine signed the

agreement but, prior to signing, modified it to require the Board
to give him a new parole revocation hearing2.

(R. at 15) . On June

14, less than one week after Remine's release from prison and after
discovering the modification, the Board directed Remine's parole
agent to present him with a new, unmodified copy of the agreement
for signature.

(R. at 17). Remine refused to sign.

(!£.)

Based

on that refusal, AP&P filed an allegation that Remine had violated
his parole by refusing to cooperate with the Board and refusing to
sign the agreement without making modifications.

(!£.)

The Board

issued a warrant for Remine's arrest and re-incarceration pending
a parole revocation hearing.
The Board convened the parole revocation hearing on August 25,
1994.

Through

counsel, Remine moved

revocation allegations.

(R. at 4).

to dismiss

the parole

On August 31, 1993, the Board

granted Remine's motion to dismiss but nevertheless rescinded the

1

The Board's revocation of the April 23, 1991 parole date is
at issue before this Court in a separate appeal, Remine v. Utah
Board of Pardons. Case No. 930752-CA.
2

Before the signature line on the parole agreement, Remine
printed the following addition: "only if the Board schedules a new
parole revocation hearing." (R. at 15; Addendum D ) .

3

June 8, 1993 parole release date, thus terminating parole and
recommitting Remine to prison.

(R. at 27) . In the same order, the

Board gave Remine a new parole date of February 8, 1994, which was
later rescinded due to numerous disciplinary violations at the
prison.

(Id.)

Remine is still at the Utah State Prison and the

Board has decided not to parole him again.

Instead, Remine will

remain in prison until his sentence expires on July 12, 1995.

(R.

at 14) .
SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT
Remine rejected parole by modifying his parole agreement.
Under contract law, through which an analysis of this proceeding
can be undertaken, in order to constitute an acceptance of an
offer, the acceptance must be the mirror image of the offer.
Remine's modification constituted not an acceptance of the parole
agreement but a rejection and counteroffer.

Thus, parole never

actually began and the Board legitimately withdrew its offer of
parole as soon as it discovered the alteration and reincarcerated
Remine.
Additionally, by giving Remine a parole revocation hearing,
rather than a rescission hearing, the Board actually gave Remine
more due process than required.

Under the analogous situation of

probation, a failure to sign a probation agreement means that
probation never really occurs and a revocation hearing is not
needed to validly withdraw the revocation offer.

Similarly, in

this case, parole never actually legally began so rescission was
4

appropriate.

Given

this,

Remine's

due process

rights were

respected and the Board fully complied with the law in its
procedures.
ARfflPMENT
I.

REMINE'S MODIFICATION OF TEE PAROLE AGREEMENT
INDICATED BIS REJECTION OF TEE TERMS OF TEE
AGREEMENT; THEREFORE, THE BOARD PROPERLY
COMPLIED WITH UTAH LAW WHEN IT TERMINATED HIS
PAROLE.
A.

Under contract
law principles,
Remine's alteration constituted a
counteroffer and rejection of the
Board-issued parole certificate;
therefore, Rexaine never entered into
a lawful parole agreement.

On May 13, 1993, the Board of Pardons sent Remine an order
telling him that he would be paroled on June 8, 1993. (R. at 14;
Addendum C) .

However, the order also informed Remine that his

release would be contingent on his agreement to the conditions of
parole, which would be evidenced by his signing
agreement.

the parole

(I£.) This requirement to sign the parole agreement is

not merely a Board decision, but is taken from state law.3
As Remine admits in his complaint, he signed the parole
agreement but modified it without the prior consent of the Board.
Because

the

Board

and

Remine

were

not

in

the

process

of

negotiation, Remine's unconsented modification actually constituted
3

"When the Board of Pardons releases an offender on parole,
it shall issue to the parolee a certificate setting forth the
conditions of parole which he shall accept and agree to as
evidenced by his signature affixed to the agreement." Utah Code
Ann. § 77-27-10 (Supp. 1993).
5

a disagreement with the parole conditions. The parolee's signature
normally evidences consent to the parole conditions set forth in
the Board-issued certificate. Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-10 (Supp.
1993).

Due to his addition of a new clause, however, Remine's

signature evidenced consent not to the Board-issued certificate,
but to a new parole agreement that the Board neither issued nor
authorized.
Though the parole agreement is not exactly analogous to the
typical contract, it is helpful to review the facts in this case in
light of contract law concepts.

Invoking a principle that one

commentator calls the "mirror-image" rule, this Court has ruled
that

an

acceptance

not

in

conformity

with

the

offer

is a

counteroffer, not an acceptance; therefore, there is no contract.
Cal Wadsworth Construction, v. City of St. George. 865 P.2d 1373,
1377 n.3 (Utah App. 1993) (citing Crane v. Timberbrook Village.
Ltd. . 774 P.2d 3, 4 (Utah App. 1989)); 1 E. Allan Farnsworth,
Farnsworth on Contracts. § 3.21 (Little, Brown & Co. 1990)4.

In

contract terms, the Board-issued contract constituted the offer.
Remine's modification, being an addition to the agreement, was a
counteroffer and his signature was merely indicative of his intent
to be bound by the counteroffer should it be accepted.
4

"An attempt to add to or change the terms of the offer turns
the offeree's response from an acceptance into a counteroffer and
a rejection of the offer.
This rule is sometimes called the
'mirror image' rule because it requires that an acceptance be the
mirror image of the offer." 1 E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on
Contracts. § 3.21, at 259 (Little, Brown & Co. 1990).
6

In

reality

then,

Remine

never

signed

a

lawful

parole

agreement; his modification evidenced not only a disagreement with
the terms of parole but a rejection of the Board's offer of parole.
Thus, because there never was a lawful parole agreement, parole
never technically began and Remine was not "paroled" from prison.
He was released by mistake.
B.

Due to the lack of a lawful parole
agreement, Remine's parole never
began and the Board acted properly
in issuing a warrant for his reincarceration and rescinding his
parole.

In State v. Ruesaa. 851 P.2d 1229 (Utah App. 1993) (Addendum
E) , the trial court revoked a person's probation because he failed
to sign the probation agreement.
appeal

as

a

probation

Because the case came up on

revocation,

the

Court

affirmed

the

revocation; nevertheless, from the content of footnote two, it
appears that this Court believes a revocation was not needed. X£.
at 1231 n.2.5

Thus, the opinion provides a helpful insight into

5

"The written probation agreement, which details the
conditions of probation, embodies a defendant's acceptance of
probation and the prescribed conditions. Inasmuch as a defendant's
refusal to sign a probation agreement manifests an unwillingness to
accept the conditions of probation, in a sense probation never
occurs where such unwillingness is demonstrated. If he [Ruesga] in
fact wanted to comply with the terms of his probation, the clearest
manifestation of such would have been to sign the agreement. . . .
By this sequence of events, defendant himself appears to have
refused probation, which therefore never came into being. Seen in
this light, there may have been no probation to revoke and it is
far from clear that an evidentiary hearing was even required." Ifl.

7

the actual legal effect

of Remine's rejection of the parole

agreement.
In asserting that the trial court may not have needed to hold
a

revocation

hearing,

this

Court

implicitly

found

that

an

alternative procedure for imposition of the prison sentence may
have been appropriate. By inference, the Court would have affirmed
the trial court's action even if, rather than hold a revocation
hearing, the trial court had merely

"rescinded" the offer of

probation and imposed the prison term based on Ruesga's rejection
of probation.
Although it began the proceedings to terminate Remine's parole
as a parole revocation, in the end, the Board took the action
impliedly suggested in Rue sera.

Acting from the proposition that

Remine's June 8 parole never legitimately began, it gave him the
opportunity to sign a clean copy of the parole agreement (R. at 17)
and begin parole in a proper fashion.

When he refused that

opportunity, the Board rectified the mistaken release and rescinded
the parole.6
6

An inmate is not entitled to his freedom merely because he
is mistakenly released from prison. See Green v. Christiansen, 732
F.2d 1397, 1399 (9th Cir. 1984) (prison authorities properly
recommitted inmate after he was released by mistake) . Also, in
United States v. Merritt. 478 F-Supp. 804, 807 (D.D.C. 1979), the
court ruled that an erroneously released inmate will be excused
from serving the balance of his sentence only if: (1) he did not
contribute to the error; (2) the prison authorities' actions
amounted to more than simple neglect; (3) the situation brought
about by reincarceration would be "unequivocally inconsistent with
fundamental principles of liberty and justice."

8

II.

BECAUSE THE BOARD GRANTED REMINE A PAROLE
REVOCATION HEARING, INCLUDING COUNSEL AND THE
RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE, REMINE HAD ALL THE
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS REQUIRED FOR THIS TYPE
OF PAROLE TERMINATION.

Due to Ruesga's failure to sign the probation agreement, this
Court expressed its opinion that a probation revocation evidentiary
hearing may not have been required to satisfy due process.
Ruescra. 851 P.2d at 1231-32 n.2.

Here, Remine's parole also did

not technically begin because he rejected the Board's offer of
parole. By inference from Ruescra. a "rescission" of Remine's June
8, 1993 parole date may have satisfied due process.

However,

rather than hold a rescission hearing, the Board erred on the side
of caution and due process by holding a parole revocation hearing,
which grants more due process protection than a mere rescission
hearing. Compare Utah Admin. Code R671-505 (1994) with Utah Admin.
Code R671-310 (1994); Addendum F).
Given the Board's decision to proceed with a parole revocation
hearing, Remine's protests that he was not afforded due process
fall

short

of

stating a

claim

for relief.

Indeed, Remine

essentially is arguing that he should have been given a rescission
Remine does not meet these requirements. Not only did he
contribute to the error by modifying and then signing the
agreement# the prison's apparent failure to notice the discrepancy
does not appear to have been more than simple neglect. Also,
unlike those cases finding that recommitment would be fundamentally
unfair due to the inmate's rehabilitation while free for a long
period of time, see Shields v. Beto. 370 F.2d 1003, 1004 (5th Cir.
1963) (attempt to commit erroneously released inmate who had been
free for twenty-eight years) , Remine was only out for ten days and
proved uncooperative even during that limited time.

9

hearing.

However, the state's unilateral decision to give Remine

more due process than required did not harm his legal interests.
It probably benefitted him.
Because the Board's procedures were more than adequate to
protect Remine's constitutional right to due process, his petition
truly fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In
Lancaster v. Utah Board of Pardons, 233 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah
Feb. 28, 1994), the Utah Supreme Court stated that the courts were
not allowed to review the discretionary decisions of the Board
regarding parole.

This decision builds upon other decisions of

this Court that recognize the Board's substantive independence from
judicial second-guessing. Specifically, in Northern v. Barnes, 825
P.2d 696, 698 (Utah App. 1992), aff'd Northern v. Barnes. 227 Utah
Adv. Rep. 90

(Utah Dec. 10, 1993), this Court ruled that in

reviewing a parole rescission a trial court could not reweigh the
evidence and modify the Board's substantive decision to rescind
parole.
Therefore, because Remine cannot show a procedural due process
violation in the Board's decision-making process, his request to
overturn the Board's substantive decision, i.e., to withdraw the
parole offer and recommit him to prison, fails to state a claim.

10

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Board respectfully requests
that this Court affirm the trial court's order denying Remine's
request for relief and dismissing the petition.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this itik

day of May 1994.

JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

rltiuJ^

ies H. Beadles
Assistant Attorney General

11

CERTIFICATE OP MAILING
I certify that on the

1*>(L day of May 1994, I caused to be

mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true and correct
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to:
William Remine
P.O. Box 550
Utah State Prison
Gunnison, Utah 84634
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

77-27-10. Conditions of parole - Intensive early release parole program.
(1) (a) When the Board of Pardons releases an offender on parole, it shall issue to the
parolee a certificate setting forth the conditions of parole which he shall accept and agree to as
evidenced by his signature affixed to the agreement.
(b) A copy of the agreement shall be delivered to the Department of Corrections and a copy
shall be given to the parolee. The original shall remain with the board's file.
(2) If an offender convicted of violating or attempting to violate Section 76-5-301.1,
Subsection 76-5-302(1), Sections 76-5-402, 76-5-402.1, 76-5-402.2, 76-5-402.3, 76-5-403,
76-5-403.1, 76-5-404, 76-5-404.1, or 76-5-405, is released on parole, the board shall order
outpatient mental health counseling and treatment as a condition of parole. This subsection does
not apply to intensive early release parole.
(3) (a) In addition to the conditions set out in Subsection (1), the board may place offenders
in an intensive early release parole program. The board shall determine the conditions of parole
which are reasonably necessary to protect the community as well as to protect the interests of
the offender and to assist the offender to lead a law-abiding life.
(b) The offender is eligible for this program only if he:
(i) has not been convicted of a sexual offense; or
(ii) has not been sentenced pursuant to Section 76-3-406.
(c) The department shall:
(i) promulgate rules in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Act, for operation of the program;
(ii) adopt and implement internal management policies for operation of the program;
(iii) determine whether or not to refer an offender into this program within 120 days from
the date the offender is committed to prison by the sentencing court; and
(iv) make the finalrecommendationto the board regarding the placement of an offender
into the program.
(d) The department shall not consider credit for time served in a county jail awaiting trial
or sentencing when calculating the 120 day period.
(e) The prosecuting attorney or sentencing court may refer an offender for consideration
by the department for participation in the program.
(f) The board shall determine whether or not to place an offender into this program within
30 days of receiving the department's recommendation.
(4) This program shall be implemented by the department within the existing budget.
(5) During the time the offender is on parole, the department shall collect from the offender
the monthly supervision fee authorized by Section 64-13-21.

(c) 1953-1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of The Mead Corporation

R671-505. Parole Revocation Hearings.
R671-505-1. General.
R671-505-1. General.
Prior to the Parole Revocation Hearing, the parolee shall be given adequate written notice of
the date, time and location of the hearing and the alleged parole violations. At the hearing, the
offender shall be provided with an opportunity to hear the evidence in support of the allegations,
legal counsel unless waived, an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses
unless they would be subject to risk or harm, and an opportunity to present evidence and
witnesses in his/her own behalf.
Parolees are served with written allegations and notice of the hearing at least five working days
prior to the Revocation Hearing. Such service and notice may be waived by the parolee. These
allegations are again read at the hearing, after which the parolee enters a plea.
The parolee may plead guilty at the initial hearing and the dispositional phase will begin
immediately, or the Board may continue the hearing upon request of the parolee, or on its own
motion, pending the outcome of a court criminal action or an Evidentiary Hearing.
If a guilty plea is entered or the offender is found guilty in an Evidentiary Hearing, the Board
will then hear discussion as to disposition from the offender or the attorney for the offender and
the Department of Corrections. The Board may then retire to Executive Session, make a
decision, reopen the hearing and render the decision on the record.
1993

77-27-11
77-27-27
77-27-28
77-27-29
77-27-30

(c) 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of The Mead Corp.

R671-310. Rescission Hearings.
R671-310-1. Rescission Hearings.
R671-310-1. Rescission Hearings.
Any prior Board decision may be reviewed and rescinded by the Board at any time until an
offender's actual release from custody.
If the rescission of a release or rehearing date is being requested by an outside party,
information shall be provided to the Board establishing the basis for the request. Upon receipt
of such information, the offender may be scheduled for a rescission hearing. The Boa: J may also
review and rescind an offender's release or rehearing date on its own initiative. Except under
extraordinary circumstances, the offender should be notified of all allegations and the date of the
scheduled hearing at least seven calendar days in advance of the hearing. The offender may
waive this period.
In the event of an escape, the Board will rescind the inmate's date upon official notification
of escape from custody and continue the hearing until the inmate is available for appearance,
charges have been resolved and appropriate informationregardingthe escape has been provided.
The hearing officer shall conduct the hearing and make an interim decision to be reviewed,
along with a summary report of the hearing, by the Board members.
1993

77-26-7

(c) 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994 By The Michie Company, A Division of The Mead Coip.

ADDENDUM B

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY

REMINE, WILLIAM
PLAINTIFF
VS
BOARD OF PARDONS

CASE NUMBER 930906673 HC
DATE 02/02/94
HONORABLE HOMER F WILKINSON
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK DAG

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY.
D. ATTY.

4-501 RULING
BASED ON THE FOLLOWING, RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS IS
GRANTED:
1. PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION ON RULE 65B OF UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE
2. PETIOTIONER HAS FAILED TO EXHAUST HIS ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEMDIES
3. PETITIONER'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS
4. PETITIONER'S CLAIM IS FRIVOLOUS ON ITS FACE.
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY AND FOR DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT BECOMES MOOT.
THE RESPONDENT SHALL PREPARE AN ORDER AND THE NECESSARY
FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
CC: LORENZO MILLER
WILLIAM REMINE

t\r. t i •*

••••'•ctelttistrist

'*,'*A(r*A
LORENZO K. MILLER (5761)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondents
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2525
Telephone: (801) 575-1600
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM REMINE,
FINAL ORDER
Petitioner,

!

v.
UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS,

:
:
:

Case No. 930906673
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Respondents.
The above-entitled matter came before this Court on
February 2, 1994, for Respondents' Motion to Dismiss.

The Court

having issued its ruling by minute entry on that date now makes
the following:
ORDER
1.

The petition in this case is a petition for

extraordinary relief that should be filed pursuant to Rule
65B(e); however, it was improperly properly filed under Rule
65(b) and (c) .
2.

For the reasons stated and set forth in the

February 2, 1994 minute entry, Respondents' motion to dismiss is

00125

granted.
3.

The relief requested by Petitioner is denied,

4.

The action is dismissed forthwith.

DATED this

(

da

y

of

E*bruary, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

IONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON
Third District Court

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the

28th day of February, 1994, I caused

to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINAL ORDER
to:
William Remine
P.O. Box 550
Central Utah Correctional Facility
Gunnison, Utah 84634
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Cheryl Hansen

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ORDER OF PAROLE
UTAH STATE OBSCIS NO. 00032763
UTAH STATE PRISON NO. 20102
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF BEMJHEr WILLIAM GARY

This matter of application for parole, termination of sentencef or
expiration of sentence having come before the Utah State Board of Pardons
in a regularly scheduled hearing on the 13th day of May, 1993, and the
applicant appearing in person or having waived in writing the right to
appearance and the Board having heard the case, issues the following order:
It is hereby ordered that REMINE, WILLIAM GARY be paroled from the
unishment and sentence heretofore imposed upon him/her by a judge of the
hird District Court in and for the County or Salt Lake for the crime(s) of
BURGLARY, 3rd degree felony, Expiration 07/12/95.

f

The parole shall not become effective until 8th day of June, 1993.
The applicant agrees to the conditions of parole and evidences his agreement by
signing the parole agreement. The parole agreement or contract shall be
administered by duly authorised agents of the Utah State Department of
Corrections for the Utah State Board of Pardons.
It is further ordered that if and in the event the above named applicant
shall be guilty of any infractions of the rules and regulations of the Utah
State Prison or shall fail or refuse to perform duties as assigned bv the Utah
State Prison or is found to be in violation of any other law of the State of
Utah prior to the effective date of said parole, then this Order of Parole is
revoked and becomes null and void.
Dated this 13th day of May, 1993.
By Order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this
12th day of May, 1993, reduced its decision in this matter to writing and
hereby affix my signature as Chairman for and on behalf of the State of
Utah, Board of Pardons.

nnm i
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Cheryl Hansen

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Name: REMINE, WILLIAM GARY

PAROLE AGREEMENT
OBSCIS No.
32763

USP No.

20102

I agree to be directed and supervised by agents of the Utah State Department
of Corrections and will abide the following conditions of my parole:
1. RELEASE:
On the day of my release from the institution or confinement,
I will report to my assigned Parole Agent, unless otherwise approved in
writing from the parole office.
2. ABSCONDING:
I will not abscond from parole supervision:
A. Reporting: I will report as directed by the Department of Corrections
B. Residence: I will establish and reside at a residence of record and
will not change my residence without first obtaining permission from
my parole agent.
C. Leaving the State: I will not leave my state of residence, even
briefly, or any other state to which I am released or transferred
without prior written permission from my parole agent.
3. CONDUCT:
I will obey all State, Federal and municipal laws. If
arrested , cited or guestioned by a peace officer, I will notify my
parole agent within 48 hours of the incident.
4. HOME VISITS: I will permit visits to my place of residence by agents of
Adult Probation and Parole for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the
conditions of my parole. I will not interfere with requirement; i.e.
having vicious dogs, perimeter security doors, refusing to open the door,
etc.
5. SEARCHES:
I will permit agents of Adult Probation and Parole to search
my person, residence, vehicle or any other property under my control,
without a warrant, at any time, day or night, upon reasonable suspicion
to ensure compliance with the conditions of my parole.
6. WEAPONS:
I will not own, possess, have under my control or in my
custody any explosives, firearms or dangerous weapons as defined in Utah
Code Annotated. Section 76-10-501, as amended.
7. EMPLOYMENT:
Unless otherwise authorized by my parole agent, I will seek,
obtain and maintain verifiable, lawful full-time employment (32 hours per
week minimum) as approved by my parole agent. I will notify my parole
agent of any change in employment within 48 hours.
8. ASSOCIATION: I will not knowingly associate with any person who is
involved in criminal activity or who has been convicted of a felony,
without approval from my parole agent.
9. CHEMICAL ANALYSIS: I will submit to test of my breath, body fluids or hair
to ensure compliance with my parole agreement.
10. TRUTHFULNESS: I will be cooperative, compliant and truthful in all my
dealings with Adult Probation and Parole.

11. SPECIAL CgNDITIONS ; _ L y U I ;

,

^s*^
I Successfully complete ISP Program.
sffMZ.
2 Submit to random drug testing.
sZ*C3 Successfully complete Mental Health Therapy.
Zc J* 4 Not be self employed with legal business license, taxes and
v>_CJ
5 approval of Parole Officer.
Pj+jS.
6 Provide Parole Officer with documentation of employer
^ ^
contracts.
I have read, understand and agree to be bound by this agreement. If I violate
any of the conditions of this agreement, the Board of Pardons may revoke my
parole or the Department of Corrections may take other appropriate actionf
against me.
oj>/y ; /? TA* 0e**S fct*c/vf*s
* "**" f*"» < *'"
g/py/P^
SIGNED:
J Z ^ jg&ZZ*^/}
USP NO: 4^£^z
~DATE

h!L

WITNESSED BY:

AUTHORIZED BY:

/^^sGL

r^E^S?^^—

BOARD OF PARDONS
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fy the prosecutor from the sentencing hearing. Accordingly, Gray's convictions are
affirmed.
BILLINGS and GREENWOOD, JJ.,
concur.

®
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Fernando RUESGA, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 920426-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 22, 1993.

Probation revocation proceeding was
brought The Salt Lake County District
Court, Timothy R. Hanson, J., revoked probation. Defendant appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Orme, J., held that defendant's
failure to sign probation agreement was a
willful violation of probation.
Affirmed.

4. Criminal Law «=»982.6(.5)
Defendant is free to accept court's offer to spend time under probation or to
decline court's good grace and spend entire
sentence in prison.
5. Constitutional Law *»27<K5)
Due process requires conditions of probation to be clear enough so that defendant
has notice as to what constitutes probation
violation. U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 5, 14.
6. Constitutional Law e»27<X5)
Criminal Law *»982.9<1)
Defendant was not denied due process
when trial court revoked probation based
on his refusal to sign probation agreement,
although court did not specifically state
during sentencing that signing probation
agreement was a condition of probation,
where at first hearing on motion to show
cause trial court told defense counsel, with
defendant at his side, that it would continue hearing for two weeks but if defendant
did not sign probation agreement, he was
going to prison and defendant failed to sign
agreement U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 5, 14.
7. Criminal Law *»982.9<5)
For trial court to revoke probation
based on violation of probation, it must
determine by a preponderance of the evidence that violation was willful or, if not
willful, must presently threaten safety of
society. U.CJL1953, 77-18-1(10).

1 Criminal Law *»114?
Court of Appeals will reverse trial
court's determination on whether to revoke
probation only if evidence, when viewed in
light most favorable to court's decision, is
so deficient that it must be concluded trial
court abused its discretion.

8. Criminal Law *»982.9<6)
Trial court entered ample oral and
written findings to support conclusion that
defendant willfully refused to sign probation agreement and therefore violated probation; after considering testimony from
both sides court specifically found that probation officer's testimony was believable
and credible while defendant's testimony
was not, defendant manifested attitude
that he could do what he wanted, and defendant's language suggested refusal to
cooperate and sign agreement

S. Criminal Law *»U58Q)
Trial court's underlying factual findings supporting conclusion that defendant
violated probation will not be disturbed on
appeal unless they are clearly erroneous.

9. Criminal Law *»982.9(5)
Trial court's conclusion that defendant
understood English well enough to participate in third hearing on probation revocation without a translator was not clearly

1. Criminal Law *»982.9(.5)
Determination to revoke probation is
within discretion of trial court
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erroneous; defense counsel agreed that defendant could understand English well
enough to participate in proceedings, defendant did not ask for translator until beginning of third hearing, and defendant later
read written statement in English which,
by his own testimony, he prepared with
only minimal assistance.
Roger K. Scowcroft and Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt Lake City, for defendant and
appellant
Jan Graham and Christine F. Soltis, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.
Before GARFF, GREENWOOD and
ORME, JJ.
OPINION
ORME, Judge:
Defendant appeals the revocation of his
probation based on his unwillingness to
sign a probation agreement He argues
that signing the agreement was not a condition of probation, that his failure to sign
was not willful, and that he lacked the
ability to understand the proceedings
against him. He also contends that the
trial court's findings supporting its decision
are in error. We affirm.
FACTS
On February 18, 1992, defendant pled
guilty to one count of unlawful possession
of a controlled substance, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(2XaXi) (Supp.1992). On April 6,
1992, after the Office of Adult Probation
and Parole had evaluated defendant and
recommended he be incarcerated, the trial
court sentenced defendant to a prison term
of zero to five years and imposed a 15,000
fine, but stayed the sentence pending completion of eighteen months probation. The
court required defendant to spend six
months in jail and to pay $1,500 of the fine
plus a twenty-five percent surcharge. At
sentencing, the court described the general
conditions of probation, which included prohibitions against possessing controlled substances and drinking alcohol and directives

to complete appropriate treatment programs, to establish a permanent address,
and to work full time. On April 28, 1992,
in response to an affidavit filed by defendant's parole officer alleging defendant refused to sign a standard probation agreement, the district court issued an Order to
Show Cause why defendant's probation
should not be revoked. Three hearings
transpired subsequent to that order.
At the first hearing, on May 4, defendant, through counsel, denied the allegation that he refused to sign the probation
agreement. However, due to a family
emergency that had arisen for defense
counsel, the court granted a two-week continuance for the hearing. Before concluding the proceedings, the court warned: "If
Mr. Ruesga doesn't sign the probation
agreement, he's going to prison. Simple as
that"
When the second hearing commenced on
May 18, defendant had not yet signed the
probation agreement. On several occasions throughout the hearing, the court
asked why the probation agreement had
not been signed, and defense counsel reiterated defendant's willingness to sign. Yet,
counsel never stated defendant would do so
unconditionally, nor did defendant ever actually sign the agreement, although it was
apparently available for his signature. Defense counsel stated that defendant was
willing to sign the agreement if the court
would strike the Order to Show Cause.
However, from all that appears, even if
defendant had admitted to the allegations
in the affidavit, which was the basis for the
Order to Show Cause, the judge and probation officer were still willing to proceed
with probation, providing only that defendant sign the implementing agreement In
response to the court's inquiry as to the
State's position in the case, defendant's
probation officer stated that "[i]f he's willing to sign, we'll give him a try."
As the hearing continued, the court discovered that defendant had also threatened
to go to Mexico when he was released from
jail. Defense counsel never denied defendant's statement or intent to go to Mexico,
but attempted to explain "[i}t's not his in-
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tention to just leave Utah, Your Honor,
He just wants to go to Mexico to see his
parents/' Upon hearing this, and having
no signed probation agreement in hand, the
court, apparently frustrated by defendant's
recalcitrance, scheduled an evidentiary
hearing for June 2.
At the June 2 hearing, defendant requested an interpreter who would translate
English to Spanish for him. The court
refused the request Only defendant and
his parole officer testified at the hearing.
Defendant's parole officer recounted the
April 16 incident at the jail when defendant
refused to sign the agreement She testified that when she attempted to explain the
parole agreement the defendant became
"extremely argumentative," contesting the
$1,875 fme as incorrect' and claiming the
agreement did not reflect what took place
in court According to the parole officer,
defendant used profanities and vituperative
epithets directed at the court to exclaim he
did not have to do what the trial judge told
him to do. Furthermore, she testified that
defendant "stated he was going to go to
Mexico."
Defendant testified that his lack of proficiency in English led to him misunderstanding the agreement He further explained
that he did not even know what probation
was when his probation officer spoke to
him, that he planned to go to Mexico only
after he completed his probation obligation
in Utah and not immediately upon release
from jail, and that he was willing to do
everything required to complete his probation, including signing the probation agreement
After testimony and arguments concluded, and after the court orally explained the
basis for its decision, the trial court terminated its offer to grant probation and committed the defendant to the Utah State
Prison. Defendant objected to proposed
1. The S1J75 figure accurately reflected the trial
court's reduction of defendant's fine from
$5,000 to $1,500 plus the required twenty-five
percent surcharge.
1

Although the trial court entered a judgment
upon conviction whereby it placed the defendant on probation, arguably defendant did not
begin probation until he entered into a written

written findings submitted the next day by
the State, but on June 9, 1992, the court
signed those findings.
Defendant makes the following claims on
appeal: (1) the court erred by revoking
probation based on failure to sign the
agreement and (2) the court's factual findings concerning the willfulness of the probation violation and the defendant's ability
to understand English are clearly erroneous.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1-31 A determination to revoke probation is within the discretion of the trial
court We will reverse only if the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the court's decision, is so deficient
that it must be concluded the trial court
abused its discretion. State v. Jameson,
800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990). Furthermore, the court's underlying factual findings supporting its conclusion that defendant violated probation will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous.
State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 209 (Utah
App.1991).
FAILURE TO SIGN AS PROBATION
VIOLATION
[4-6] Defendant's chief argument on
appeal is that the trial court denied him due
process by revoking probation based on his
refusal to sign the probation agreement
because the court had not explicitly stated
during sentencing that signing the probation agreement was a condition of probation. While due process certainly requires
conditions of probation to be clear enough
so that defendant has notice as to what
constitutes a probation violation, see Douglas v. Buder, 412 UJ3. 430, 432, 93 S.Ct
2199, 2200, 37 LE<L2d 52 (1973), defendant's position in this case is untenable.2
probation agreement Under Utah law, " lp]ro
bation' is an act of grace by the court suspending the imposition or execution of a convicted
offender's sentence upon prescribed conditions," Utah Code Ann. f 77-27-1(10) (Supp.
1992). The defendant n free to accept the
court's offer to spend time under probation or
to decline the court's good grace and spend the
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Even if, as defendant claims, he had no
notice that signing the agreement was a
condition of probation at the time of sentencing, the record of the first hearing on
the Motion to Show Cause leaves no doubt
that defendant was on such notice after
May 4. As noted above, the court told
defense counsel, with defendant at his side,
that it would continue the hearing for two
weeks, but "[i]f Mr. Ruesga doesn't sign
the probation agreement, he's going to
prison. Simple as that" Yet, the agreement remained unsigned two weeks later
at the May 18 hearing. If anything, the
trial court was abundantly generous in allowing defendant two weeks to sign a probation agreement, a simple act that would
take but a moment
Defendant asserts that despite the notice
he received during the first hearing, the
revocation was based solely on defendant's
refusal to sign the agreement at the jail,
not on his failure to sign after the court's
explicit warning. It follows, he contends,
that since the court did not tell him at
sentencing that signing the agreement was
a condition of probation, he could not have
violated probation by refusing to sign the
agreement at the jail on April 16. While it
is not altogether clear that defendant's argument would prevail even if termination
was based on the single refusal to sign at
the jail, we believe the court's termination
of probation was correctly based on defendant's refusal to sign the agreement at any
time after the sentencing hearing, not just
at the time of the jail incident The agreement was not signed at the jail; it was not
signed at the May 4 hearing; it was not
signed in the subsequent two weeks; it
was not signed at the May 18 hearing.
While the court's findings, viewed in iso»
entire sentence in prison. The written probation agreement, which details the conditions of
probation, embodies a defendant's acceptance
of probation and the prescribed conditions. Inasmuch as a defendant's refusal to sign a probation agreement manifests an unwillingness to
accept the conditions of probation, in a sense
probation never occurs where such unwillingness it demonstrated. If he in fact wanted to
comply with the terms of his probation, the
clearest manifestation of such would have been
to sign the agreement Defendant's reluctance
to enter into probation is further evidenced by

lation, appear to emphasize the jail episode,
the court clearly had in mind this entire
pattern of refusal in making its revocation
decision.
WILLFULNESS OF VIOLATION
[71 Having concluded that signing the
probation agreement was a condition of
defendant's probation, which defendant violated, we turn to consider whether the
court correctly concluded defendant violated that condition willfully. In order for a
trial court to revoke probation based on a
violation of probation under Utah Code
Ann. § 77-18-1(10) (Supp.1992), it must determine by a preponderance of the evidence
that the violation was "willful or, if not
willful, must presently threaten the safety
of society." State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270,
2T7 (Utah App.1990). In State v. Archuleta, 812 P.2d 80 (Utah App.1991), this court
held that willfulness "merely requires a
finding that the probationer did not make
bona fide efforts to meet the conditions of
his probation." Id at 84. As applied to
this case, the Archuleta rationale suggests
that where defendant did not make a bona
fide effort to cooperate with probation officials to initiate his probation, despite warning by the court, he willfully violated his
probation. Cf. State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d
270, 275 (Utah App.1990) (probationer's inability to complete treatment program due
to physiological problem was not willful
violation because his efforts to participate
were genuine). Defendant claims the trial
court's findings do not support the conclusion that the violation was willful. We
disagree.
[8] The trial court entered ample oral
and written findings to support its concluhis testimony at the June 2 hearing that, when
asked to sign the agreement at the jail, "I did say
that I would rather do all the time, and just get
out of there without probation." By this sequence of events, defendant himself appears to
have refused probation, which therefore never
came into being. Seen in this light, there may
have been no probation to revoke and it is far
from clear that an evidentiary hearing was even
required. &*e Utah Code Ann. f 77-18-1(10)
(Supp.1992). Nonetheless, because this case is
postured as a probation revocation proceeding,
we will treat it as such.

Utah 1233

STATE v. RUESGA
Cite at SSI ?2d 1229 (UtahApp. 1993)

sion that defendant willfully refused to
sign the probation agreement and therefore violated probation. At the June 2
hearing, after considering testimony from
both sides, the court explained in detail the
basis for its decision. The court specifically found: (1) the probation officer's testimony was believable and credible, while the
defendant's testimony was not; (2) defendant manifested an attitude that he could
do what he wanted; (3) defendant's language suggested a refusal to cooperate
and sign the agreement; and (4) defendant
"knowingly and intelligently, and with purpose refused to cooperate with Adult Probation and Parole and sign the probation
agreement." Notwithstanding that the
oral findings alone sufficiently support the
court's determination that defendant violated his probation, see Hodges, 798 P.2d at
274, the court subsequently signed written
findings, which in essence were a summary
of the oral findings.
The court's findings reveal "the evidence
relied on and the trial court's reasons for
revoking appellant's probation." Id Contrary to defendant's contention that the
findings are clearly erroneous, we believe
they are amply supported and form a
sound basis for the court's decision. The
findings demonstrate that the court did not
abuse its discretion in revoking defendant's
probation.
DEFENDANTS ABILITY TO
UNDERSTAND PROCEEDINGS
[9] Defendant argues the court's additional finding that defendant could understand the proceedings is clearly erroneous.
That finding reads:
3. That the defendant, while having a
limited understanding of English, has an
adequate command of the English language to fully understand the proceedings before this Court and the conditions
of probation as presented by [his probation officer].
We believe the court's finding is fully
supported by the record in this case. Defendant appeared at several proceedings in
circuit court, including a preliminary hearing; an arraignment, at which he pled
guilty; and two of the three hearings on
the Motion to Show Cause—all without re-

questing a translator. Despite these appearances, defendant first asked for a
translator at the beginning of the third
hearing on June 2. The judge refused his
request at that time. Defendant later read
a written statement in English, which, by
his own testimony, he prepared with only
minimal assistance. He testified at the
hearing with no apparent difficulty. After
defense counsel referred to defendant's
"difficulty understanding what he's supposed to do here," the following exchange
occurred:
THE COURT: Are you telling me, Mr.
Scowcroft, that with regard to your
client's understanding that it's now your
position that he doesn't understand the
English language well enough to proceed
in these proceedings?
MR. SCOWCROFT: I'm not saying that,
Judge. We've not had an interpreter
during these proceedings. There have
been a number of appearances we've
made in court— I think his command
of the English language is somewhat
marginal and I think his heavy accent is
evidence of that. That's all I could say
really in that regard.
The record largely speaks for itself. In
light of defense counsel's agreement that
defendant could understand English well
enough to participate in the proceedings,
we would certainly be reluctant to override
the trial judge who reached the same conclusion after having had several opportunities to view and hear defendant Accordingly, defendant's claim of error is without
merit
CONCLUSION
Defendant's failure to sign the probation
agreement was a willful violation of his
probation. Moreover, the trial court's conclusion that defendant understood English
well enough to participate in the third hearing without a translator was not clearly
erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm the
probation revocation.
GARFF and GREENWOOD, JJ., concur.
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